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Abstract
The literature on political business cycles suggests that politicians systemati-
cally manipulate economic and ﬁscal conditions before elections. The literature on
vote and popularity functions suggests that economic conditions systematically af-
fect election outcomes. This paper integrates these two strands of literature. We use
Rogoﬀ (1990)’s model of the rational political business cycle to derive the two-way
relationship between the win-margin of the incumbent politician and the size of the
opportunistic distortion of ﬁscal policy. This relationship is estimated, for a panel
of 275 Portuguese municipalities (from 1979 to 2001), as a system of simultaneous
equations (by GMM). The results show that (1) opportunism pays oﬀ, leading to a
larger win-margin for the incumbent; (2) incumbents behave more opportunistically
when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical
model.
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11 Introduction
To what extent are economic policies in democratic societies distorted by the competitive
struggle for votes? How strong is the impact of the economy on election results? These
questions have occupied researchers for a long time, but have mostly been investigated
separately. On the one hand, the literature on political business cycles (PBCs) focuses on
identifying distortions in macroeconomic and ﬁscal variables around election times.1 On
the other hand, the literature on vote and popularity (VP) functions focuses on identifying
the impact of economic and ﬁscal conditions on election results.2 Yet, the PBC and the
VP function are intimately related: rational politicians would not attempt to create a
political business cycle if it did not help them win elections and rational voters would not
base their vote decisions on economic and ﬁscal conditions if it did not help them select
better politicians. The aim of this paper is to bridge these two strands of literature and
to estimate the VP function and the ﬁscal distortion created by opportunistic politicians
trying to win elections jointly. This allows us to provide a new test of the rational political
business cycle theory proposed by Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990). This theory
has previously been tested by looking for distortions in ﬁscal outcomes before elections, but
not by studying its implications for the joint determination of the probability of winning
elections and the ﬁscal distortion.
Research on electoral economics took oﬀ in the 1970s with the seminal works of Good-
hart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer (1971) on the VP function and with
the work of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) on political business cycles. Right from
the beginning, the two literatures developed in parallel and, with the notable exception
of Frey and Schneider (1978a,b) who estimated politico-economy models for the United
States and the United Kingdom that took the interrelations between the economy and the
polity explicitly into account, there was little attempt of integration.
The rational expectations revolution forced the literature to raise to the challenge that
rational voters cannot be systematically fooled one election after the other by opportunis-
1See Paldam (1997), Alesina et al. (1997), Drazen (2000: 219-308) or Mueller (2003: 429-471) for
surveys of this literature.
2See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Paldam (2004) for surveys.
2tic politicians. New models were developed where the PBC resulted from asymmetries of
information between politicians and voters. Alesina (1987), for example, showed how pre-
election uncertainty about the ideology of competing political parties can explain rational
partisan cycles in macroeconomic aggregates. Around the same time, Rogoﬀ and Sibert
(1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990) developed the canonical model of the rational political business
cycle in which incumbents signal their competence to the electorate by manipulating ﬁscal
policy instruments before elections.3 With the introduction of rational expectations into
the models, empirical research shifted the focus from data on aggregate economic out-
comes to data on economic policy instruments, particularly to those of ﬁscal policy. To
some extent, the emphasis also shifted from the national to the sub-national level with an
increasing interest in the study of political business cycles in local and state elections.4
The interest in political business cycles has recently been renewed, but the current discus-
sion is predominately about which characteristics of a polity might support or discourage
political business cycles. According to Shi and Svensson (2006), the magnitude of electoral
budget cycles increases with the size of the rent that politicians can earn by remaining
in oﬃce and with the share of uninformed voters in the electorate. Brender and Drazen
(2005) argue that opportunistic ﬁscal manipulations are more pronounced in "new" than
in "established" democracies because, in the former, voters are inexperienced with elec-
toral politics and are less able to detect ﬁscal manipulations. On the other hand, Alt
and Lassen (2006) argue that, conditional on the degree of ﬁscal transparency, political
business cycles are as likely in advanced industrialized economies as elsewhere.
Yet, the two-way relationship between elections and the economy remains under-
researched, and only rational partisan theory has been properly tested in such a setting.
3Some public choice scholars have pointed to an alternative explanation of the PBC: rational ignorance
of voters in the face of information costs. Instead of assuming that citizens have high levels of information
that allow them to detect and punish opportunistic politicians, they argue that many economic actors
have little incentive to be informed about economic policies and that opportunistic politicians will take
advantage of this, in particular when the percentage of uninformed voters is high (see Willet and Keil
(2004)).
4Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Rosenberg (1992) where the ﬁrst to test political budgetary cycles using
local data. For an extended revision of the empirical literature about the U.S. see Besley and Case (2003).
For studies about Germany see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For Sweden see Petterson-Lidbom
(2001). Finally, see Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, Drazen and Eslava (2005) for Colombia,
and Veiga and Veiga (2007) for Portugal.
3Using an empirical model that allows for the joint determination of economic growth and
national election outcomes in the United States, Alesina et al. (1993) report evidence
that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that the economy has a strong
eﬀect on voting in presidential elections. Part of the reason why so few studies attempt
to integrate the PBC and the VP function is, as pointed out by Willet and Keil (2004:
414) in their survey of the literature, that the micro incentives behind, in particular the
rational political business cycle, have received insuﬃcient empirical attention.
Theoretically, these incentives are clear: PBC models with rational voters a la Rogoﬀ
(1990) not only predict that politicians will try to signal their type by distorting ﬁscal
choices before elections, it also suggests that politicians are rewarded for doing so at the
polls. In fact, the theory suggests that the vote and popularity function and the ﬁscal dis-
tortion created by opportunistic politicians are jointly determined and therefore should be
estimated together. Two recent studies by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Drazen
and Eslava (2005), dealing with local governments in Russia and Colombia respectively,
do estimate vote and popularity functions along side with tests for opportunistic cycles in
ﬁscal policy, but treat the two separately. To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet
taken the theory seriously and attempted to estimate the vote function and the extent of
the opportunistic political business cycle jointly as a system of equations. The purpose of
this paper is to ﬁll this gap. We, ﬁrstly, develop a version of the canonical model of the
rational political business cycle from which we derive the two equations to be estimated.
Secondly, we estimate these equations on data from 275 Portuguese municipalities using a
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator.
We use data from Portuguese municipalities for several reasons. First, we have compiled
a large and detailed data set covering 275 mainland municipalities since 1979 to 2001 (seven
elections). Second, the mayor is the principal decision-maker in the municipality and is in
a position from which he can manipulate important expenditure items for election purpose.
Third, all Portuguese municipalities operate under the same institutional framework and
have access to the same policy instruments. This allow us to avoid many of the pitfalls
associated with cross national studies. Finally, election dates are ﬁxed and exogenous from
4the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities have elections on the same
day. Taken together these factors make this data set a very promising testing ground for
a study of the interrelationship between the VP function and the political business cycle.
Using a similar dataset, Veiga and Veiga (2007) presented evidence of rational politi-
cal business cycles in Portuguese municipalities. But, like many of the above-mentioned
studies, they do not account for the joint determination of the vote function and of the
PBC, since they only test for the latter. Furthermore, the eﬀects of the incumbent’s ex-
pected margin of victory (or defeat) on the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion are
not considered in their estimations. The present study therefore adds substantially to this
previous work.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some institutional information
about the Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the model and derives the two
equations to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the data sources and the empirical strat-
egy adopted. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2 Local Government in Portugal
The Portuguese municipalities were formally established by the Constitution of 1976, after
the bloodless military coup of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship.
The ﬁrst municipal election took place in December of 1976. Until 1985 elections were held
every third year and after that every fourth year. Election dates are ﬁxed nationally and
therefore exogenous from the perspective of the municipalities. During our sample period
(1979-2001), all elections took place in December and there were no legal restrictions on
the number of times a mayor could stand for election.
The municipalities are governed by the Municipal Assembly and the Town Council.5
The Municipal Assembly has deliberative power and it approves the general policy frame-
work. The presidents of the councils of the freguesias,6 w h i c hm a k eu pe a c hm u n i c i p a l i t y ,
5Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework for the various branches of the
municipalities.
6Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.
5are automatically members of the Assembly, while the rest are elected directly by the vot-
ers registered in the municipality. The Town Council holds executive power and it designs
and implements local policies. Its members are all elected directly by citizens who vote for
party or independent lists of candidates.7 The top candidate from the list that receives
the most votes becomes mayor. The mayor is the president of the Town Council and plays
a leading role in the executive and has substantial power and autonomy.
The municipalities are responsible for a large variety of activities, ranging from urban
planning and territory organization to the supply of local public services and regulation.
The local public services controlled by the municipalities include sewage, distribution of
water and energy, local transportation and communication, elementary education, patri-
mony, promotion of culture and science, provision of recreation and sports facilities, local
health care, social housing, environmental protection and municipal policing.
The municipalities operate within the same institutional framework and are all sub-
ject to the same ﬁnancial regime.8,9 With this common regime, the municipalities are
ﬁnancially autonomous and can, without authorization from a higher-ranked authority,
deﬁne their own budget, collect the revenues they are entitled by law and allocate expen-
ditures.10 Nonetheless, the Town Council and the mayor who heads it have relatively little
discretional power with regard to revenues, as, on average, 70% of per capita income are
transfers from the central government and/or from the European Union. Moreover, the
bulk of current expenditures go to salaries, expenditures on electricity, water, etc., and
are largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate. Importantly, however, the mayors
can control the level and timing of capital expenditures, which, along with the fact that
these are highly visible spending items, make them appropriate targets for mayors willing
7Votes are transformed into seats using the Hondt method. After all the votes have been tallied, the
following quotient (V/(S+1)) is calculated for each party, where V is the total number of votes that the list
received and S is the number of seats that the party has been allocated so far (initially 0 for all parties).
The party having the highest quotient gets the ﬁrst seat allocated, and its quotient is recalculated given
its new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.
8During the period analyzed four local ﬁnance laws were introduced: Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84,
Law 1/87, and Law 42/98.
9For a detailed description of municipal ﬁnances in Portugal, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
10They are of course subject to several control mechanisms by central government agencies, but these
are merely inspective.
6to woo voters to win elections.
3T h e o r y
In this section, we lay out a version of the rational political business cycle model developed
by Rogoﬀ (1990) and Rogoﬀ a n dS i b e r t( 1 9 8 8 ) .T h ep u r p o s eo ft h ee x e r c i s ei s ,ﬁrstly, to
draw out implications of the theory which have not yet been subject to systematic testing
and, secondly, to allow theory to guide our empirical identiﬁcation strategy.
3.1 The model
We consider a simple two-period economy (t =1 ,2) populated with a continuum of citizen-
voters.11 Citizen-voters care about private consumption (ct) and two types of public goods
(g1,t and g2,t+1). Public good 1 (g1) is a short-term public good while public good 2 (g2)
is a long-term public good. Investments in the short-term public good lead to immediate
provision of services that can be directly observed within the period. Investments in the
long-term public good, on the other hand, lead to provision only with a one period time
lag. As a consequence, citizen-voters cannot infer how much was invested in this good until
later when they observe the provision levels generated by past investments. The life-time
utility function of a representative citizen-voter is
u
v = c1 +l ng1,1 + θlng2,1 + β (c2 +l ng1,2 + θlng2,2), (1)
where β ∈ (0,1) i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ra n dθ is the relative importance of long-term public
goods.12 Each citizen-voter is endowed with y units of a non-storable good each period,
pays the lump sum tax τt and consumes ct = y −τt. Public goods are produced from tax
revenues by an elected politician using a simple linear technology:
g1,t + g2,t+1 = τt + εt (2)
where εt is a stochastic competency term. We note that the cost of investment in the
long-term public good provided in period t +1is incurred in period t.
11The model is a simpliﬁed version of Rogoﬀ (1990).
12We assume that g2,1 =1 .
7Each period a citizen-voter is elected to run the government and to produce public
goods. To simplify the analysis, we assume that τ is exogenously given and that the
politician, therefore, only has to decide on the allocation of resources between the two
types of public goods. Citizen-voters diﬀer with respect to their talent for being politicians
and some are more competent than others. Speciﬁcally, a citizen-voter is either competent
(εt = εH)o ri n c o m p e t e n t( εt = εL <ε H)a sap o l i t i c i a n . W ea s s u m et h a tc o m p e t e n c y
is permanent, i.e., if a politician is competent in period 1 he is also competent in period
2 and vice versa. The probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent is
ρ ∈ (0,1). Politicians derive utility from private and public goods, but also care about
holding oﬃce per se because of the power or prestige that goes with it. To capture this,
we assume that politicians receive the ego-rent m per period in oﬃce. In addition to
competency, citizen-voters also care about the ideology of their elected politician. This
is modelled as a random shock to citizen-voters’ preference for the incumbent relative to
that of the challenger in each election. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the advantage (or
disadvantage) of the incumbent at time t is
αt = μ − συt, (3)
where μ and σ are parameters and σ>0. The random variable υt captures ideological
shocks. It is drawn before each election from a symmetric unimodal distribution F(υt)
with zero mean and variance one. We assume that F is diﬀerentiable and denote the
density function by f. The ideological shock lasts for one period only and is unrelated to
competency. The parameter μ captures the average incumbency advantage (or disadvan-
tage).
The information structure of the model can best be laid out by listing the timing of
events:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent observes his competency ε1 and decides
on how to allocate resources between the two public goods (g1,1,g 2,2).
2. Voters observe α1 and how much is provided of the short-term public good (g1,1).
83. At the end of period 1, an election takes place where the incumbent runs against
a randomly chosen challenger. The incumbent is reelected if he is supported by a
majority of citizen-voters; otherwise the challenger takes oﬃce.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the incumbent, if reelected, decides how much to
invest in the short-term public good.13 If the challenger is elected, she observes her
competency (ε2) and decides on how much to invest in the short-term public good.
We notice that the incumbent in period 1 does not observe the ideological bias (υt)
until after he has decided ﬁscal policy for the period. This, as we shall see, implies
that he cannot be sure about the outcome of the election. He does, however, know the
distribution and that allows him to form a judgement about how big or small his advantage
is on average.
The structure described above is a sequential game of incomplete information and the







, one for each type, and a reelection rule for citizen-voters
(that determines the probability of reelecting the incumbent as a function of observed ﬁscal
policy) such that the incumbent of each type selects an optimal ﬁscal allocation given the
reelection rule; citizen-voters’ reelection rule is optimal given their beliefs about the type of
the incumbent and the incumbent’s strategies; and beliefs are whenever possible updated
according to Bayes’s rule. To narrow down the set of equilibria, we shall impose additional
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs below.
3.2 Equilibria
We begin by noting that the optimal ﬁscal policy in the second period is to invest all
resources in the short-term public good and so g1,2 = τ +εi irrespective of the type of the
second-period incumbent. Supposing that the ﬁrst-period incumbent is reelected, we can
write the second-period utility of a citizen-voter, net of the beneﬁt of the long-term public
13In period 2, nothing is invested in the long-term public good because it is the last period.
9good, as a function of the type of the ﬁrst-period incumbent as
W(i)=y − τ +l n ( τ + εi) for i ∈ {L,H}, (4)
The corresponding net second-period utility if a challenger of unknown type is elected is
W(C)=y − τ + ρln(τ + εH)+( 1− ρ)ln(τ + εL), (5)
where C represents "challenger". If citizen-voters only cared about provision of public
goods, then it is clear from these expressions that they would reelect an incumbent who
is known to be competent for sure and boot out an incumbent who is known to be incom-
petent. However, in practice citizen-voters also care about ideology and a representative
citizen-voter casts a vote in favour of the incumbent if and only if
b ρ(g1,1)W(H)+( 1−b ρ(g1,1))W(L) − W(C)+α1 ≥ 0, (6)
where b ρ(g1,1) represents the citizen-voters’ updated beliefs (that the incumbent if of type
H) after having observed the ﬁrst-period investment in short-term public goods. From
the point of view of the ﬁrst-period incumbent, who does not observe υ1 until after he has
decided on ﬁscal policy, the probability of getting reelected is









which is increasing in the belief that the incumbent is competent.
Following Snyder (1989) and others, we say that the incumbent has an advantage in
the election if, under the condition that both types of incumbents choose the same level
of spending and thus b ρ(.)=ρ, the probability of reelection is greater than 1
2.N o t i c et h a t






Since F is symmetric and unimodal with zero mean, it is clear, then, that the incumbent
has an advantage if and only if μ>0. Moreover, the advantage is increasing in μ.O nt h e
other hand, the incumbent has a disadvantage if and only μ<0.
10Faced with this reelection rule, the ﬁrst-period incumbent, whether competent or not,
decides how to allocate resources between the two types of public goods taking into account
how this choice aﬀects his reelection chances. Following Persson and Tabellini (1990,
chapter 5), it is convenient to deﬁne the following two objects: the value of reelected and
the cost of signalling. The (expected) value of being reelected for a politician of type εi is
V (εi)=m +( W (i) − W (C)). (9)
He gets the ego-rent for another period and beneﬁts (or not) from the fact that he, in
expectation, is more (or less) eﬃcient at providing public goods than a randomly chosen




























Signaling entails a distortion of ﬁrst-period resources (too much is spent on short-term
public goods and too little is spent on long-term public goods). The cost of signalling,
therefore, is the diﬀerence between the short-run optimal allocation of ﬁrst-period resources
between short- and long-term public goods and the actual choice of allocation (gi
1,1).14
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) The unique intuitive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies is a separating equilibrium and is characterized by the following strate-
gies and beliefs:






1+βθ in period 1.I fr e e l e c t e d ,
he sets gL
1,2 = τ + εL in period 2.
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14With the logaritmic utility functions, the short-run optimal allocation is b gi
1,1 = τ+εi
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Figure 1: Separating Equilibria
with gs being deﬁned as
g























If reelected, he sets gH
1,2 = τ + εH in period 2
3. Citizen-voters’ posterior beliefs are b ρ(g1,1)=1for all g1,1 ≥ gs
1,1 and b ρ(g1,1)=0for
all g1,1 <g s
1,1 and the reelection rule is given by equation (6).
Proof. See Appendix
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 w h e r ew eh a v ed r a w nt h ec o s to fs i g n a l i n g
and the expected value of reelection for the two types of incumbents as a function of g1,1.
The expected value of reelection is always larger for a competent than for an incompe-
tent incumbent. This is because the former can provide more second-period public goods
than the average politician while the latter cannot. The cost of signaling is represented by
the parabolas with the competent incumbent’s cost of signaling shifted to the right reﬂect-
ing the fact that it is "cheaper" for the competent incumbent to increase spending on the
short-term public good from his short-run optimal level (
τ+εH
1+βθ)t h a ni ti sf o rt h ei n c o m -




1+βθ and prefers to do so pretending to be competent as long as gH
1,1 is no less than
gs. An incumbent of type H, on the other hand, is, if needed, willing to deviate upwards
12from his short-run optimal policy choice to signal to citizen-voters that he is competent
as long as the cost of signaling is no greater than the expected beneﬁt of reelection. Any
gH
1,1 in the interval A, indicated with the bold line in the Figure, constitute a separating
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is clear, however, that gH
1,1 >g s is more costly to the
competent incumbent and thus dominated by gH
1,1 = gs.15 The theory therefore predicts
that ﬁscal policy is distorted before the election because competent politicians need to
convince rational voters that they are indeed competent. This is the Rational Political
Business Cycle (RPBC).
The extent of signalling depends among other things on the advantage (disadvantage)
of the incumbent (captured by μ). This is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Incumbency Advantage) Assume that gs >
τ+εH
1+βθ. An increase (decrease)
in the average advantage (disadvantage) of the incumbent (μ ↑) reduces the incentive to
distort ﬁscal policy to signal competency if and only if










=0 . Moreover, a large (small) incumbency advantage (disad-
vantage) increases the reelection chance of all types of incumbents.
Proof. From equation (12), we note that the incentive to signal competency by distorting
ﬁscal policy depends on
π(1) − π(0) = F
µ



























∂μ ≤ 0 ⇒
∂gs
∂μ ≤ 0.S i n c eF is unimodal and symmetric around zero,
it follows that
∂(π(1)−π(0))
∂μ ≤ 0 if and only if
μ + W (H) − W (C)
σ
− 0 ≥ 0 −
μ + W (L) − W (C)
σ
15Since reelection is random, pooling equilibria in which both types of incumbents chose g1,1 = τ+εH
1+βθ
in period 1 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
13μ
0





Figure 2: The relationship between incumbency advantage and the incentive to distort
ﬁs c a lp o l i c yt os i g n a lc o m p e t e n c y .
or










0(ρ)=l n ( τ +εH)−ln(τ +εL) > 0. The observation that
the reelection probability of all types of incumbents increases in μ follows immediately
from equation (7)
The main implications of the proposition are illustrated in Figure 2. Recall that the in-
centive to distort ﬁscal policy to signal competency is controlled by the diﬀerence between
the reelection probability of a competent and an incompetent politician, π(1)−π(0).T h i s
diﬀerential is a quasi-concave function of μ,a si l l u s t r a t e di nt h eﬁgure for two diﬀerent val-
ues of ρ (the probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent). The reason
for this non-monotonicity is that incumbency advantage increases the election prospect
of all types of incumbents. Accordingly, when an increase in μ increases the prospect
of the competent type more than that of the incompetent type, the incentive to distort
ﬁscal policy is enhanced. Conversely, the incentive is reduced if incompetent politicians
beneﬁt more from incumbency advantage than competent ones. From Figure 2, we see
that the peak of the PBC depends on ρ. When competency is scarce and only a small
faction of the population of potential politicians is competent (ρ<1
2), the PBC peaks
14when the incumbent has a disadvantage. In contrast, when there is an abundance of com-
petent politicians in the population (ρ>1
2), the PBC peaks when the incumbent has an
advantage. Irrespective of the distribution of competency in the population, incumbency
advantage eventually tempers the incentive to distort ﬁscal policy and
∂(π(1)−π(0))
∂μ becomes
negative for μ suﬃciently large.
While proposition 2 characterizes the set of theoretical possibilities, two empirical ob-
servations allow us to narrow down the set of outcomes we might, in fact, observe. Firstly,
in practice, there are good reasons to believe that competency is scarce, i.e., that ρ<1
2.
One reason is that ability is widely believed to be drawn from a left-skewed distribution
(e.g., a log-normal distribution).16 Another reason is self-selection. Individuals, who would
become competent political leaders if they were to stand for election (and be elected), are
also individuals who tend to be successful in their private jobs. Accordingly such individ-
uals are more likely to select not to become politicians than less competent ones whose
outside options in the private sector are worse. Secondly, a large empirical literature has
established that incumbents have an advantage in winning elections.17 This suggests that
μ is likely to be positive. Taken together the two observations suggest that over the em-
pirically relevant range, the relationship between incumbency advantage and the ﬁscal
distortion is negative and monotonic (as illustrated by the bold segment in Figure 2).
3.3 Empirical Implications of the Theory
We are interested in testing the relationship implied by the theory between what we
might call the (average) opportunistic distortion (OD)a n dt h e( a v e r a g e )win-margin of









where gs is implicitly deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) ,a n di ss i m p l ya ne xa n t em e a s u r eo ft h e
size of the average political business cycle. Theoretically, the average win-margin can be
16This observation is, for example, the basis for virtually all applied work on optimal taxation (see, e.g.,
Tuomala, 1990).



















which is the type-weighted ex ante probability that the incumbent is reelected.
According to the theory, OD and WM are jointly determined at equilibrium. On the
one hand, the degree of signalling is a determinant of the win-margin. On the other hand,
the win margin, through its eﬀect on the reelection diﬀerential between competent and
incompetent politicians, is a determinant of the size of the opportunistic distortion. We
can therefore write the structural form of the model laid out above as
WM = h(OD,Z) (17)
OD = k(WM,X), (18)
where h and k are functions and X and Z are (possibly overlapping) vectors of other
determinants of the opportunistic distortion and the win-margin.
The theory of the RPBC imposes some restrictions on h and k that we are interested
in testing. Firstly, since the posterior belief that the incumbent is competent, b ρ(g1,1),
is non-decreasing in g1,1, the model predicts that opportunistic behavior pays oﬀ in the
sense that the win-margin is (weakly) increasing in the size of the opportunistic distortion
( ∂h
∂OD ≥ 0). Secondly, the theory predicts that the win-margin is linked to the opportunistic
distortion through variations in incumbency advantage as described by proposition 2. The
opportunistic distortion is a quasi-concave function of incumbency advantage, increasing
at ﬁrst, then decreasing. In practice, there are, as discussed above, good reasons to believe
that we only observe this relationship over a limited range and that the opportunistic
distortion is monotonically declining in the win-margin over this range. Based on this,
we expect that ∂k
∂WM < 0, but allow in the empirical speciﬁcation for the possibility of
non-monotonicity.
Both the win-margin and the opportunistic distortion are endogenous variables. Ac-
cordingly, to identify the links between them empirically, we need to impose restrictions
on the structure form. We use the theory to motivate some of these exclusion restrictions.
Firstly, we note that the parameter θ,w h i c hc o n t r o l st h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fl o n g - t e r m
16versus short-term public goods, aﬀects the opportunistic distortion directly, while its im-
pact on the win-margin is indirect (through its eﬀect on the opportunistic distortion). In
particular, the larger is θ, the higher the cost of signaling and the lower is gs and, ceteris
paribus, the opportunistic distortion.18 More broadly, we can interpret θ as a measure
of voter awareness of the opportunity cost of spending on easily observable expenditure
items. Secondly, the availability of funds (τ) also has a direct (positive) eﬀect on gs be-
cause the cost of signalling falls and the value of reelection (V (εL)) increases, while the
eﬀect on the win-margin is indirect. Thirdly, the ego-rent increases the beneﬁt of reelec-
tion and directly increases the opportunistic distortion. Based on these observations, it
is reasonable to exclude factors that aﬀect voter awareness, the availability of funds and
the ego-rent from the equation for the win-margin. On the other hand, the opportunistic
distortion is unlikely to be directly aﬀected by general economic conditions, while these
factors are likely to aﬀect the win-margin directly. We shall build on this identiﬁcation
strategy in the empirical speciﬁcation below and deﬁne X and Z accordingly.
4 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
The data set consists of political, ﬁnancial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese
mainland municipalities, for the local election years of 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997
and 2001.19 Municipal election dates and results were obtained from the Technical Staﬀ
for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o
Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of the Internal Aﬀairs Ministry. Data on municipal local














∂θ < 0.S i n c e
(τ+εH)
1+βθ also decreases in θ,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on the opportunistic
distortion is ambiguous.
19Although there also was an election in October 2005, data from the municipal ﬁnancial accounts are
only available until 2003. The election of 1979 is not included in the analysis whenever lags, term averages
or deviations from term averages are included. For the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas,
Trofa and Vizela) there is only election data for 2001 (the last election in our sample), which means that
there is no data for the votes obtained in the previous elections. Thus, in the estimations, we have a
maximum of 275 municipalities.
17accounts were obtained from the local authori t y ’ s( D i r e c ç ã oG e r a ld a sA u t a r q u i a sL o c a i s-
DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report
exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2003. For the two missing years data was
obtained directly from the municipalities’ oﬃcial accounts and are incomplete: we have
182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 1985. The consumer price index and the national
unemployment rate were taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Data on
the total number of employees in ﬁrms within each municipality and on their average
wages, from 1985 to 2003, was obtained from the “Quadros de Pessoal” database, of the
Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).20 Finally, demographic data
was obtained from the National Statistics Oﬃce (INE).
As discussed above, our empirical model consists of a system of two simultaneous
equations: a vote and popularity function representing the win-margin and an equation
for the opportunistic distortion. We measure the win-margin of the incumbent as the
diﬀerence between the vote share of the mayor’s party and that of the largest opposition
party. We measure the opportunistic distortion as the percentage deviation of investment
expenditures (IE) in an election year from the election term average. The later choice is
motivated by the fact that opportunistic distortions are, in practice, most likely to show up
in budgetary items whose timing of implementation is controlled by the mayor and which
are visible to the electorate. As noted in section 2, the municipalities do not have much
freedom to set revenue instruments, as transfers from the national government represent
the main source of funding, and current expenditures are strongly conditioned by salaries
which are regulated by rigid labor contracts. Accordingly, investment expenditures, which
are largely controlled by the mayors, are the most likely place to look for evidence of
opportunistic behavior.21
Based on the discussion of exclusion restrictions above, we can expand equations (17)
20The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately
owned ﬁrms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).
Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, there is no data on wages for 2001. In
order to avoid missing values, for each municipality, we set the wages for 2001 equal to the simple average
between those of 2000 and 2002.
21For results indicating that opportunism occurs in investment expenditures, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
18and (18) as follows:
WMit = β1ODit + β2IEit + β3YM it + β4RRit (19)
+β5WMi,prev.el. + β6GPit + β7Empit
+β8Wagesit + νi + δt +  it
ODit = φ0WM it + φ1 (WMit)
2 + φ2IEit + φ3YM it + φ4RRit (20)
+φ5CTtmit + φ6∆CTit + φ7Pop65it
+φ8PopDensit + φ9Rightit + γi + ϕt + μit
where i =1 ,.....,275 is the index for municipalities and t indicates election years.22 Both
equations include municipal ﬁxed eﬀects (γi and υi) and election year ﬁxed eﬀects (ϕt and
δt). β1 to β8 and φ0 to φ9 are parameters to be estimated and μit and  it are random
error terms with E(μit)=E ( it)=0 . Our main objective is to estimate jointly the eﬀect
of opportunism (OD) on the win-margin (WM)a n dt h ee ﬀect of the win-margin on the
degree of opportunism. The theoretical analysis suggests that β1 > 0 and that φ0 > 0 and
φ1 < 0.
We divide the exogenous variables into three groups. The ﬁrst group contains three
variables that are included in both equations. They are: average investment expenditures
during the election term preceding the election of year t (IE); the number of years the
incumbent mayor has been in oﬃce (YM); and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the in-
cumbent mayor runs for reelection and 0 otherwise (RR). We expect that low average
investment expenditures (IE) make it easier to be opportunistic and to create a large per-
centage deviation of investment expenditures from the average at election times (φ2 < 0).
We also expect that average investment expenditures are positively related to the win-
margin as voters reward mayors for keeping investments high on average throughout the
term (β2 > 0). We expect that the number of years the incumbent mayor has served
(YM) reduces the win-margin because, as documented by e.g., Mueller (1970), Frey and
Schneider (1978a,b) and Veiga and Veiga (2004a), popularity tends to erode with time in
22The election years are 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.
19oﬃce (β3 < 0), and that mayors with longer tenures are more experienced and so are more
able to manage investment expenditures opportunistically (φ3 > 0). Finally, we expect
that mayors who do not run for reelection (RR =0 ) are unwilling to incur the cost of
signalling and thus would not attempt to increase investments opportunistically (φ4 > 0).
Likewise, the party of the incumbent mayor is expected to do better when the mayor runs
for reelection than when a new, often unknown, candidate is presented (β4 > 0).
The second group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the win-
margin. Firstly, it includes two variables which are directly related to the availability
of funds, namely the average capital transfer from the national government during the
preceding election term (CTtm)a n dt h ee l e c t i o ny e a rc h a n g ei nt h ec a p i t a lt r a n s f e r( ∆CT).
Theory suggests that the availability of funds, here represented by transfers, increases the
opportunistic distortion in election years without having a direct eﬀect on the win-margin.
We expect that φ5 and φ6 are positive. Secondly, the second group also includes two
variables that are related to voter awareness which, as suggested by the theory, tends to
reduce the magnitude of the political business cycle. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)
in their study of the budget cycle in Russian regions use education and urbanization to
measure voter awareness. Unfortunately, data on education attainment at the municipality
level are not available for the time period analyzed in this paper. But, in Portugal, older
people have, on average, much less education than younger people. Thus, we can use
the percentage of the population over 65 years of age (Pop65) to proxy for low average
education levels23 and use population density (PopDens) to proxy for urbanization. We
expect Pop65 to be associated with low and PopDensto be associated with high levels of
voter awareness and we predict that φ7 > 0 and φ8 < 0. Finally, this group also includes
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mayor belongs to a right-wing party (Right).
We have no prior on the sign of φ9.
The third group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the oppor-
tunistic distortion. According to Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate may wish to
reward, or punish, the national government in second tier (local) elections. Since voters
23The same applies to the illiteracy rate, which will also be used in the empirical analysis.
20tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes,24 higher unemploy-
ment rates should lead to a lower percentage of votes for incumbent mayors who belong to
the same party as the national government. We capture this with the variable GP which is
the interaction between a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mayor belongs to
the same party as the prime minister of Portugal and the national unemployment rate.25
A negative sign is expected for β6. Since voters are expected to reward mayors who achieve
high levels of municipal employment (Emp) or high average municipal real wages (Wages)
during their tenure, we also expect β7 and β8 to be positive. Finally, we include the win-
margin in the previous election (WM i,prev.el.). This variable picks up unobserved factors
such as the mayor’s personal characteristics and ideology and party aﬃliation of voters.
We expect persistence in voter preferences (and thus in voting behavior) and predict that
β5 is positive.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Since the win-margin measures the
diﬀerence in the percentage of votes between the incumbent and his main opponent, it
assumes a negative value in case of defeat. The win-margin in the previous election must
be positive, since it refers to the results obtained by the incumbent mayor. In some cases,
the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from the election term average is
negative, indicating that not all mayors behave opportunistically.
[Insert Table 1 here]
5R e s u l t s
The results of the estimation of equations (19) and (20) as a system of simultaneous
equations, using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),26 are reported in the ﬁrst
24For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a,b). For a survey
of the international literature, see Paldam (2004).
25The interacted variables will also be included in the estimations of equation (19).
26GMM is a robust estimator in that it does not require information of the exact distribution of the
disturbances, which is an advantage relative to FIML that assumes that the contemporaneous errors have
a joint normal distribution. GMM estimation is based upon the assumption that the disturbances in the
equations are uncorrelated with a set of instrumental variables. The GMM estimator selects parameter
estimates so that the correlations between the instruments and disturbances are as close to zero as possible,
21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Name  Variable 
Abbreviation
Obs. Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max.
Win-Margin (vote difference)  WM  1889 14.49 20.28 -72.62  87.93
Win-Margin in the previous election  WMprev.el.  1897 19.32 14.64 0.02 87.93
Investment Expenditures  InvExp  1772 182.69 137.28 5.04  1439.10
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean)  IE  1623 162.35 105.02 14.13 944.52
Opportunistic Distortion: % Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean 
OD  1500 13.96 30.31 -88.55  169.34
Average Real Wages  Wages  1367 515.32 115.65 290.67 1196.98
Capital Transfers (Term Mean)  CTtm  1623 129.53 92.54 16.97 879.48
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
ΔCT  1522 10.82 40.30 -87.38  287.56
Government’s Party  GovParty  1893 0.44 0.50 0.00  1.00
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate 
GP  1897 2.79 3.28 0.00  9.17
Illiteracy Rate  IR  1897 19.35 8.63 3.75 54.98
Municipal Employment  Emp  1367 15.09 9.73 1.04 89.73
Population Density  PopDens  1897 2.82 9.05 0.06  112.75
% Population Over 65 Years Old  Pop65  1897 16.98 5.68 5.35 41.22
Right  Right  1897 0.48 0.50 0.00  1.00
Run for Re-election  RR  1813 0.80 0.40 0.00  1.00
Unemployment Rate (National)  Unemp  1897 6.45 1.54 4.07  9.17
Years Mayor  YM  1893 7.01 4.61 1.00 25.00
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. two columns of Table 2. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and the levels of statisti-
cal signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients are signalled with asterisks. The number of
observations and the adjusted R-squared for each equation are also reported.27
[Insert Table 2 here]
There is clear support for the main prediction of the RPBC model: opportunism pays
oﬀ, as the opportunistic distortion has a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the win-
margin in both speciﬁcations of equation (19). Although we allow for the possibility of a
non-monotonic relationship between the incumbency advantage and the ﬁscal distortion, in
practice, there are, as we discussed above, good reasons to believe that over the empirically
relevant range, the relationship is negative and monotonic. This is exactly what the
empirical results show, as the win-margin has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion, while its square is statistically insigniﬁcant
in both speciﬁcations of equation (20). In other words, the data strongly support the
prediction that incumbent politicians can increase their reelection chances by inﬂating
spending in the year before an election and that they have most reason or incentive to do
so when their expected win-margin (or incumbency advantage) is small.
Concerning the magnitude of the eﬀects, a one-point increase in the opportunistic dis-
tortion, increases the win-margin by approximately 0.05 points, while a one-point increase
in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic distortion by 0.3 to 0.5 points. Although
the ﬁrst eﬀect may seem small, if a mayor, in the election year, doubles investment expen-
ditures relative to their election term average, the win-margin increases by 5 points, which
could be the diﬀerence between winning and losing a close election. The second eﬀect im-
plies that a one-standard deviation increase in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic
as deﬁned by a criterion function. By choosing the weighting matrix in the criterion function appropriately,
GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. In fact, in the
presence of heteroskedasticity the GMM estimator brings eﬃciency gains relative to 3SLS.
27The speciﬁcations include dummy variables for municipalities (municipal ﬁxed eﬀects) and election
years. In order to check if results were sensitive to the geographical dummies chosen, two alternatives were
also implemented. First, dummies for districts replaced the municipal ﬁxed eﬀects (there are 18 districts
in mainland Portugal). Second, we included dummy variables for three of the four population categories
that, according to the Portuguese law, are used to determine the mayors’ wages. Results, available upon
request, are virtually identical to those obtained when using municipal dummy variables.
22Table 2: Opportunism and Vote Difference 
 GMM  GMM  3SLS  FIML 
Votes 1  2  3  4 
Equation (19): Win-margin         
Opportunistic distortion (% Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 



































































Municipal Employment  .001 
(.01) 
   
Average Real Wages  .003 
(.57) 
   
# Observations  1212  1463  1463  1463 
Adjusted R
2  .24 .18  .19  .19 
Equation (20): Opportunistic distortion 
(% Deviation of Investment 
Expenditures from their Term Mean) 



















































































# Observations  1212  1463  1463  1463 
Adjusted R
2  .35 .37  .35  .36 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes:  System of simultaneous equations estimated by the method indicated at the top of each 
column. Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables for municipal and time specific 
effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. d i s t o r t i o nb y6t o1 0p o i n t s .
Our estimates also give support to some of the secondary hypotheses. Firstly, from the
estimates of equation (19) there is evidence that the win-margin is persistent, that time in
oﬃce reduces the win-margin, that the mayor’s party does better when the incumbent runs
for reelection, and that mayors belonging to the same party as the national government are
penalized in municipal elections for high national unemployment.28 Municipal employment
(Emp)a n da v e r a g er e a lw a g e s( Wages) turned out to be statistically insigniﬁcant in the
speciﬁcation reported in column 1. Since the inclusion of these variables reduces the sample
size substantially, because data on employment and wages are available only from 1985
onwards, we decided to exclude them from the speciﬁcations reported in the following
columns and tables.29
Secondly, from the estimation of equation (20), we note that the data support the
hypothesis that opportunism is greater when the incumbent runs for reelection, when she
belongs to a left-wing party (Right=0), and when there are increases in capital transfers
from the national government in the election year. But, opportunism does not seem to
depend on average investment expenditures over the election term, on the number of
years the mayor has been in oﬃce, or on the average capital transfers over the election
term. The results concerning the eﬀects of voter awareness are mixed: the percentage
of the population over 65 years old is not statistically signiﬁcant,30 but, contrary to our
expectations, there is weak evidence of a positive eﬀect of population density on the ﬁscal
distortion.
To check the robustness of these results to alternative system estimation methods, we
also performed the estimations using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Results, reported in columns 3 (3SLS) and 4 (FIML)
of Table 2, are practically the same as those of column 2 (GMM). Thus, regardless of
the system estimation method chosen, there is clear empirical support for the theoretical
28This eﬀect is, however, not signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation reported in column 1.
29The number of observations rises from 1212 to 1463 (an increase of about 20%), and Wald tests allow
the exclusion of these variables.
30Results are similar when the illiteracy rate is used instead.
23predictions.31
The evidence presented in Table 2 looks for opportunistic distortions in investment ex-
penditures. In Table 3, we report the results for other expenditure categories.32 Although
the two main predictions of the RPBC model still receive empirical support in the spec-
iﬁcation with total expenditures (column 1), results are weaker than those obtained for
investment expenditures: the opportunistic distortion is only weakly statistically signiﬁ-
cant in the estimation of equation (19) and the coeﬃcient on the win-margin in equation
(20) is much smaller (-0.099 against -0.280). While the results for total capital expendi-
tures are similar to those for investment expenditures (column 3), the results for current
expenditures (column 2) do not accord with theory. However, as explained in section 2,
Portuguese mayors have relatively little control over current expenditures and it is, there-
fore, not surprising that these are not opportunistically managed. Finally, in column 4, we
used the subdivision of investment expenditures for which Veiga and Veiga (2007) found
the most convincing evidence of opportunism - Miscellaneous Constructions. Here results
are clearly supportive of the theoretical model’s predictions. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient
of -0.342 for the win-margin in the estimation of equation (20) is greater in absolute value
than any of those obtained for other expenditure items, indicating that the opportunistic
distortion is greatest for this expenditure item.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4, we report results for an alternative speciﬁcation
where we use the level of investment expenditures in the election year instead of the
percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their election term average as a
measure of the opportunistic distortion. Since the former is highly correlated with the
election term average, the later variable was excluded from equation (19). In equation
(20), investment expenditures in the previous year replaces the term average of those
31In order to save space, we will only report GMM results in the following tables (3 and 4). But, it is
worth noting that those obtained when using 3SLS or FIML are very similar, and are available from the
authors upon request.
32Since the variable W i nM a r g i nS q u a r e dis not statistically signiﬁcant when included, it was excluded
from the models of Tables 3 and 4 (wald tests allow for this exclusion).
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# Observations  1489  1487  1489  1212 
Adjusted R
2  .19 .15  .19  .21 
Equation (20): Opportunistic 
distortion (% Deviation of 
Expenditures from their Term Mean) 











































































# Observations  1489  1487  1489  1212 
Adjusted R
2  .37 .15  .39  .19 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes:  System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables for municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of municipal 
expenditures considered in each model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Total 
transfers are used in columns 1 and 2, and capital transfers in columns 3 and 4. expenditures, in order to better account for the persistence in this series.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Results are very similar to those of Table 2. Again, opportunism pays oﬀ,a sh i g h e r
investment expenditures in the election year lead to a larger win-margin for the incumbent
party. Also as expected, investment expenditures in the election year are larger the smaller
the (expected) win-margin is. Compared to the speciﬁcation with deviations from the
election term average (Table 2), there is, however, less evidence that opportunism depends
on whether or not the mayor runs for reelection or on her ideology. On the other hand,
the election term average of capital transfers is highly statistically signiﬁcant in all the
speciﬁcations reported in Table 4. Results obtained for total expenditures (column 3) and
capital expenditures (column 4) are similar.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Building on the literatures of political business cycles and vote and popularity functions,
this paper presents a theoretical model and empirical tests which combine the two sides
of the interaction between economics and politics. A voting function and an equation
for the determinants of opportunistic economic policies are estimated as a system of two
simultaneous equations, using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), for a sample
comprising 275 Portuguese municipalities and covering the period 1979-2001.
The empirical results clearly support the hypothesis that opportunism pays oﬀ,a s
greater expenditures in the election year (when compared to the election term average or,
simply in euros per capita) lead to greater vote diﬀerences between the incumbent and her
main opponent. There is also evidence of persistence in vote diﬀerences and of a negative
eﬀect of time in oﬃce. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the mayor’s party does better when the
incumbent runs for reelection, and that the party that controls the national government
is penalized in municipal elections for high national unemployment.
The hypothesis that, over the empirically relevant range, the magnitude of oppor-
tunism is inversely proportional to the estimated win-margin also receives empirical sup-
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Municipal Employment  .016 
(.29) 
   
Average Real Wages  .010 
(2.23)** 
   
#  Observations  1210 1461 1489 1489 
Adjusted R
2  .22 .18 .18 .18 
Equation (20): Opportunistic 
distortion (Expenditures)  
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#  Observations  1210 1461 1489 1489 
Adjusted R
2  .82 .82 .91 .82 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes:  System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables for municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level 
at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of expenditures 
considered in each model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Total transfers are used 
in column 3, and capital transfers in columns 1, 2 and 4. port. Thus, the opportunistic distortion is biggest when the incumbency advantage is
small. Opportunism will also be greater when the incumbent runs for reelection, and 
when there are increases in capital transfers from the central government in the election
year.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We start by constructing the set of separating equilibria and
then impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to narrow down the set down to a







equilibrium strategies of the two types of incumbents with gL
1,1 6= gH
1,1. Firstly, in any
separating equilibrium an incumbent of type L must chose the short-run optimal allocation
of ﬁrst-period resources, i.e., gL
1,1 =
τ+εL






Under the assumption that citizen-voters hold pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the
sense that for any g1,1 6= gH
1,1, b ρ(g1,1)=0 ,i tw o u l dn o tb eb e n e ﬁcial for an incumbent of







≥ β (π(1) − π(0))V (εL). (21)
Moreover, an incumbent of type H prefers to play gH










≤ β (π(1) − π(0))V (εH). (22)
Notice that these the two intervals overlap, that any gH
1,1 within this intersection is a
separating PBE and that the intersection may contain
τ+εH
1+βθ. Call the intersection A.




all separating equilibria within A are dominated by gH
1,1 = gs (deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) )
and can be ruled out by assuming that citizen-voters hold the (out-of-equilibrium) belief
that the incumbent is of type H for all g1,1 ∈ A. Pooling equilibria in which both types
set g1,1 =
τ+εH
1+βθ can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as in
Rogoﬀ (1990).
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